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 Abstract
 In many industries, the contemporary context of acute environ-
 mental dislocation shows the limits of traditional organizational
 recipes. In direct response to environmental challenges, com-
 panies are experimenting with new organizational solutions.
 While flexibility, or the capacity to redefine organizational form
 to follow changing purposes, is undeniably a common trend,
 these experiments otherwise differ greatly. Diversity is such, in
 fact, that it is difficult to clearly identify and define a unique
 organizational paradigm for the future.
 To explore the connection between environmental disloca-
 tion and organizational transformations, we adopt a historical
 and comparative perspective. Our empirical base of evidence is
 the luxury fashion industry in three countries, France, Italy, and
 the United States. For many years, this industry was defined by
 stable environmental conditions, and a craft model of organi-
 zation remained dominant. We show that, over a more recent
 period, increasing environmental turbulence has brought about
 a redefinition of the rules of the game. A common response has
 been for organizations to move towards greater flexibility or
 modularity and to experiment with network forms. However,
 we also show that the paths or trajectories leading to organi-
 zational flexibility have varied significantly across countries,
 reflecting historical legacies and institutional constraints. We
 identify in fact three different network forms in that industry,
 which represent national ideal types-the "umbrella holding"
 company in France, the "flexible embedded network" in Italy,
 and the "virtual organization" in the United States.
 We argue that the process of change in the luxury fashion
 industry has been one of coevolution, where environmental
 transformation and organizational change have fed upon each
 other through time. Pioneer firms in the luxury fashion industry
 originally devised organizational solutions within the bounds
 set by nationally defined constraints and opportunities. Becom-
 ing institutionalized, these early solutions in turn shaped the
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 environment for individual organizations and organizational
 populations, creating new sets of opportunities and constraints.
 In a path-dependent manner, different models of organization
 and national competitiveness thus emerged.
 In conclusion, we are brought to question the likelihood of
 full and stable convergence towards a unique organizational
 form or paradigm. There appears to be, in each national context,
 a process of construction of new organizational solutions that
 starts from local foundations. Embedded as they are in powerful
 historical and institutional legacies, organizational differences
 are there to stay, we believe, beyond the period of transition
 and acute environmental dislocation.
 (Fashion Industry; New Organization Forms; Coevolu-
 tion; Historical Perspective)
 1. Introduction
 Globalization, acute competition, the information tech-
 nology revolution, and increasing customer sophistication
 are radically redefining environmental conditions. In
 many industries, these environmental challenges are
 showing the limits of traditional organizational recipes.
 Insisting on a necessary fit between organizational solu-
 tions and environments, organization theorists argue that
 periods of severe environmental dislocation call for flex-
 ible organizational solutions that can adapt to changing
 purposes (March 1991, Lewin and Stephens 1993, Brown
 and Eisenhardt 1998, Volberda 1998). At the same time,
 a look at organizational practice shows that there are mul-
 tiple paths to organizational flexibility. Such diversity
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 makes it difficult to clearly identify and define a single
 organizational paradigm for the future.
 To explore the connection between environmental
 challenges and organizational transformations, we focus
 in this paper on the luxury fashion industry. Adopting a
 historical and comparative perspective, we find that, for
 many years, luxury fashion companies operated within a
 relatively stable environment, and the "craft" model of
 organization, characteristic of French pioneer firms, re-
 mained dominant. More recently, environmental condi-
 tions have started to change, becoming increasingly tur-
 bulent. In the face of global environmental challenges,
 luxury fashion companies have tended to move towards
 greater organizational flexibility. However, a comparison
 of the industry in France, Italy, and the United States
 shows that the trajectories leading to such organizational
 flexibility have differed significantly across national
 boundaries. We identify, in fact, three national patterns
 or "ideal types," each one corresponding to one of our
 national cases.
 We thus find strong support for a coevolution perspec-
 tive where environmental transformation and organiza-
 tional change interplay through time, feeding upon each
 other (Koza and Lewin 1998; Lewin et al., this issue;
 Koza and Lewin, this issue). Through our historical and
 comparative approach, we contribute to discussions about
 the mechanisms of coevolution. In each of the three coun-
 tries examined, we point to a path-dependent and his-
 torically constructed process of interaction between-or
 coevolution of-organization forms, global environmen-
 tal trends, and national institutional legacies. Using our
 findings to speculate further, we also take up the issue of
 the possible consequences of the coevolution process. We
 thus touch upon a key dimension of the debate on new
 organization forms-that of the ultimate congruence or
 convergence of forms. We believe that, in the luxury fash-
 ion industry, the current period of acute environmental
 turbulence is in fact a period of transition, characterized
 by search, exploration, and multiple but temporary solu-
 tions (Lewin et al., this issue). A matter open for discus-
 sion is whether, after this period of transition, the orga-
 nizational landscape will end up converging upon a
 unique, widely legitimated, and institutionalized organi-
 zational paradigm (Lewin et al., this issue). Building upon
 our empirical results, we propose at the end of the paper
 our own view on the question.
 2. Organization Forms and
 Environments
 In relatively simple and stable preindustrial times, small
 and craftlike organization forms were dominant. The first
 and second industrial revolutions, at the beginning and
 end of the nineteenth century, created the conditions for
 mass production and economies of scale. The large size
 of many new companies then turned coordination and
 control into key organizational challenges. The solution
 that emerged was the standardization of organizational
 routines combined with a hierarchical and rigidly cen-
 tralized form of control and reporting. This tightly cou-
 pled organizational solution, labeled here for short the
 bureaucratic paradigm, was gradually established
 throughout the first part of the twentieth century as a "one
 best way" that could be equally suited to all companies
 and situations (Taylor 1911).
 2.1. Bringing the Environment Back In
 In time, though, this illusion of a possible "one best way"
 ran against a stubbornly complex and multifarious em-
 pirical reality. "Prebureaucratic" craft organizations sur-
 vived, particularly in those industries where cost com-
 petition was not significant and customers valued quality
 craft production. There was increasing evidence, in fact,
 that the bureaucratic paradigm was not efficient in all sit-
 uations. This led to the idea of a contingent fit between
 organizations and their environments. The survival and
 effectiveness of organizations appeared to hinge upon the
 right match between organizational capabilities and en-
 vironmental peculiarities (Burns and Stalker 1961).
 While this idea has shaped organization theory to this
 day, the nature and direction of the fit and the mechanisms
 for change still very much remain a matter for debate.
 On one side, some have argued that environmental
 characteristics essentially determine and shape organi-
 zation forms. Contingency theorists (Woodward 1965,
 Lawrence and Lorsch 1967), population ecologists
 (Hannan and Freeman 1984), and more recently, orga-
 nizational neoinstitutionalists (Powell and DiMaggio
 1991, Scott et al. 1994) all propose variants of this ar-
 gument. Others have put forward an entirely different
 claim. Strategic choice (Child 1972) and resource depen-
 dency theories (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), the cognitive
 (Weick 1969), and the more recent postmodern argument
 (Clegg 1990) all have, in one way or another, defended
 the idea that organizations choose and shape, at least in
 part, their own environments.
 A third framework is currently emerging that appears
 to bridge the above controversy. Adopting a longitudinal
 perspective, coevolution theorists argue that environmen-
 tal transformation and organizational change interplay
 and feed upon each other through time (Koza and Lewin
 1998; Lewin et al., this issue; and Koza and Lewin, this
 issue). In periods of relative environmental stability, ex-
 isting and dominant organization forms define organiza-
 tional populations and shape in part environmental land-
 scapes. In turn, environmental transformations tend to
 ORGANIZATION SCIENCEVol. 10, No. 5, September-October 1999 623
 MARIE-LAURE DJELIC AND ANTTI AINAMO Coevolution in the Fashion Industry
 affect organizational populations and forns. In periods of
 relative stability, change takes place but only in an incre-
 mental way, in a manner analogous to species variation.
 To use the seminal and by now classic fornulation of
 March (1991), organizations and populations "exploit"
 existing resources, dominant solutions, and institutional-
 ized search routines. In times of significant environmental
 dislocation, on the other hand, individual organizations
 and organizational populations appear to be threatened.
 This triggers "exploration," that is a radical search for
 entirely new kinds of solutions.
 2.2. Organization Forms for the Future
 There is little doubt that the end of the twentieth century
 is a period of significant environmental dislocation, at
 least as much as the end of the nineteenth century had
 been in its time. Many industries and companies are hav-
 ing to face increasingly turbulent, ambiguous, and hy-
 percompetitive environmental conditions (Volberda
 1996, 1998; Brown and Eisenhardt 1998). In those con-
 ditions, the capacity to search for or "explore" appears
 necessary to ensure organizational survival. And such ca-
 pacity requires flexible and organic organization forns
 (March 1991, Lewin and Stephens 1993). Although they
 should not give up some of the clear advantages that coine
 together with standardization and exploitation, companies
 should be moving towards-or preserving-looser types
 of integrating mechanisms and more flexible organiza-
 tional features (Volberda 1996, 1998). They should find
 ways to promote cultural and political variety and still
 avoid inefficiencies, fragmentation, and political strife
 (Webb and Pettigrew, this issue).
 Design theory suggests a solution for handling this ap-
 parent contradiction-a redefinition of the organization
 as a "nearly decomposable system" (Simon 1996). Ac-
 cording to Simon, "the potential for rapid evolution exists
 in any complex system that consists of a set of stable
 subsystems, each operating nearly independently of the
 processes going on within other subsystems" (Simon
 1996: p. 193). In such complex systems, each organiza-
 tional part or module may be better adapted either for
 "exploitation" or for "exploration." Pioneering experi-
 ments by leading firms appear to point towards this kind
 of flexible combination of subsystems or modules, where
 a core competence corresponds to each module (Taylor
 1991, Miles and Snow 1986). Near decomposability, or
 modularity as it is commonly labeled, thus seems to be
 key to managing complexity in tomorrow's organiza-
 tions. And network forms of organization, allowing mod-
 ularity, are in fact emerging and thriving in many indus-
 tries (Nohria and Eccles 1992; Koza and Lewin, this
 issue).
 However, while there is widespread agreement among
 organizational practitioners and theorists alike that mod-
 ularity can indeed make it possible for organizations to
 reconcile flexibility with cost efficiency, the "network
 form" is, as of now, more of a ragbag than a clear para-
 digm. Many different organizational experiments do fit
 under the label. It seems, in fact, that the road to the future
 is not straightforward but rather leads to multiple "mi-
 gration paths" or trajectories of change. A coevolution
 perspective with a historical and comparative dimension
 can help account for this-each trajectory only makes
 sense, in fact, within a particular institutional context and
 in connection with specific historical legacies. We illus-
 trate this below, using the case of the luxury fashion in-
 dustry. The question remains whether these multiple
 forms, solutions, and trajectories may nevertheless end
 up converging or whether differences are there to stay,
 beyond the period of transition and acute environmental
 dislocation. We give our own view on the matter in the
 discussion at the end of the paper.
 3. The Luxury Fashion Industry
 Outlining the boundary of the luxury fashion industry is
 not an easy task. Although a number of apparently "ob-
 jective" dimensions come to mind when trying to define
 luxury-such as, for example, price, intrinsic aesthetic
 value, quality, rarity-those dimensions are not, in them-
 selves, fully satisfactory. They correspond to a traditional
 and somewhat outdated understanding of the luxury
 good, where value stemmed from the intrinsic features of
 a product (CERNA 1995, Jellinek 1997).
 3.1. The Luxury Fashion Industry-Definition
 Our understanding of the luxury fashion industry has in
 fact significantly evolved, particularly over the last 20
 years, at the same time that the boundaries of the industry
 were expanding. There is no such thing anymore as an
 objective and unanimous definition of aesthetic value.
 Rather, there are a potentially infinite number of life-
 styles, discourses, and definitions revealing a multiplicity
 of aesthetic worlds (CERNA 1995, Djelic and Gutsatz
 1998, Ecole de Paris 1998).
 A key defining characteristic of luxury fashion com-
 panies, in this context, is that they do not deliver only
 products but diverse sets of representations as well. Lux-
 ury fashion companies are also brand names and brand
 names are "spaces for dreams" (Ecole de Paris 1998)
 where customers can satisfy not only their material but
 also their symbolic needs. Luxury fashion products are
 generally intended for use, but they are also associated
 with some intangible dimensions that pertain to the realm
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 of meanings or aesthetics and give these goods their mar-
 ginal value (CERNA 1995, Gutsatz 1996). The definition
 proposed here reflects and reveals the fact that the borders
 between the luxury and the nonluxury segments of the
 industry may not today be as watertight as they were 30
 or 40 years ago. For luxury brands, competition may in
 fact increasingly come from beyond the boundary of the
 luxury goods industry (Nueno and Quelch 1998).
 The worldwide luxury goods market now represents a
 total of $35 billion (U.S.) (Financial Times, 27 February
 1998). On that market, French companies have contrib-
 uted a little less than 50% of total turnover in the mid-
 1990s (calculated from CERNA 1995). If one considers
 only the fashion segment of the luxury market, though,
 French companies emerge as much less significant than
 their notoriety would lead one to expect. The combined
 turnover of Yves Saint Laurent Couture, Dior, Givenchy,
 Kenzo, and Christian Lacroix reached a mere $0.5 billion
 (U.S.) in 1997. In the meantime, the Italian Armani or
 the American Ralph Lauren each had a turnover of around
 $1 billion (U.S.) (Les Echos, 30 April 1998).
 3.2. The Luxury Fashion Industry-Methodology
 This paper takes the fashion segment of the luxury goods
 market as its empirical focus and builds upon the work
 both authors have been doing on the fashion industry
 (Ainamo 1996, Djelic and Gutsatz 1998). In particular, it
 draws selectively upon the first results of a large-scale,
 comparative project on the luxury goods industry. The
 object of that project has been to identify and describe
 evolutions through time and tendencies in the luxury
 goods industry with regard to environmental trends, or-
 ganizational forms, and managerial competencies. Upon
 completion of the project, the empirical base will include
 around 40 companies in three different countries-
 France, Italy, and the United States-the distribution by
 country paralleling more or less closely the weight of
 each country in the industry.
 For the purposes of this paper, we considered only the
 fashion segment of the luxury goods industry, and we
 decided to focus more particularly on a few companies
 for each country. These particular companies were se-
 lected for their ideal typical nature and/or for their overall
 weight in the national or worldwide markets. The results
 presented in this paper reflect information obtained on
 this small sample of companies through interviews, press
 reviews, and the analysis of available written documents.
 The data collection and the chosen methodology have had
 both a comparative and an historical dimension, allowing
 us to identify similarities but also differences across time
 and space (Chandler 1990, Guillen 1994, Djelic 1998).
 We were able in this way to identify national patterns and
 to point to path-dependent and historically embedded tra-
 jectories in each country. At the same time, though, our
 methodological choices have constrained our ambitions.
 And the most we can claim is that these national patterns
 are ideal types, to which exceptions may easily be found
 in each country. Table 1 gives a summary description of
 the sample of selected companies.
 In France, the Louis Vuitton Moet Hennessy group
 (LVMH) brings together under the same umbrella com-
 pany some of the world most famous fashion names
 (Givenchy, Christian Lacroix, Kenzo, Celine, and
 Christian Dior). Together, these houses or brand names
 represent a significant share of the French luxury fashion
 industry, and the peculiar structure of LVMH makes it a
 unique entity worth looking at in greater detail. We also
 chose to focus on Hermes as possibly the most vocal ad-
 vocate of a French tradition of luxury and, as such, an
 interesting ideal type for the purposes of our study. For
 contrast, we finally looked at Pierre Cardin, the French
 company that may stand the furthest away from this
 French model and tradition.
 In Italy, we selected Armani on the grounds, firstly, of
 its overall weight in the Italian, but also in the worldwide
 fashion industry. The recent and astounding success of
 Gucci and Prada, which have become important players
 on the fashion market in only a few years, explains why
 they were also included in our sample.
 In the United States, the sheer size of Ralph Lauren
 and Calvin Klein and the apparent success of their rela-
 tively similar strategy have made them interesting ideal
 types. For good measure, we also included Donna Karan,
 which, with a similar strategy, is turning out to be much
 less successful.
 Our historical and comparative data collection allows
 us to document major transformations, particularly over
 the past twenty years, in the environment of luxury fash-
 ion companies. In ? 4, we point to a number of global
 trends affecting all of these companies across national
 boundaries. We then present, in ? 5, the different re-
 sponses which these companies have come up with to
 adapt to environmental transformations. Beyond a com-
 mon tendency towards increasing flexibility, these orga-
 nizational responses are very much embedded in national
 institutional contexts and peculiar historical legacies.
 4. Environmental Trends and Challenges
 in the Luxury Fashion Industry
 The luxury fashion industry originated in France in the
 middle of the nineteenth century when a British tailor
 who had settled in Paris-Charles Frederick Worth-de-
 cided to sign his products, thus claiming the originality
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 Table 1 Luxury Fashion Companies-A Sample
 FRANCE ITALY UNITED STATES
 LVMH (sales 1997: US$450m) Armani (sales 1996:US$750m) Ralph Lauren (sales 1997: US$900m)
 Hermes (sales 1997:US$120m) Gucci (sales 1997:US$100m) Calvin Klein (n.a.)
 Pierre Cardin (n.a.) Prada (sales 1997:US$190m) Donna Karan (sales 1997:US$540m)
 Note. Sales figures are for apparel only. They do not include accessories, leather, cosmetics, or perfumes.
 of his creations and the specificity of his image. Until the
 1960s, the industry amounted in fact to a handful of Pa-
 risian haute couture houses serving a privileged clientele
 and characterized by labor intensive, craftlike processes.
 This small but dominant group of French players all but
 managed to close off the boundaries of the industry.
 4.1. The Institutionalization of Stability before 1970
 Organized through a professional association-the
 Chambre Syndicale de la Haute Couture-French tradi-
 tional players were for a long period of time able to con-
 trol entry into the luxury fashion industry by institution-
 alizing a set of strict rules (Grumbach 1993). Under those
 rules-for the most part still in force today-the label
 haute couture could be delivered only to those companies
 that fit the following requirements:
 (a) employing at least 20 persons in the production of
 clothes in the company's studios,
 (b) presenting for each season-spring and fall-a col-
 lection of at least 75 designs,
 (c) presenting these collections with the help of at least
 three live models, and
 (d) doing so in the house itself, in special areas de-
 signed for this purpose (Crane 1997).
 The stringent nature of these rules in effect made it
 nearly impossible for foreign competitors to obtain the
 label haute couture and thus, at least until the 1960s, to
 gain the legitimacy that was required to impose them-
 selves within the industry. Thanks in part to their first
 movers' advantage, French traditional players in the lux-
 ury fashion industry thus managed to define and control
 their own environment. For many years, they were able
 to institutionalize and enjoy a stable and predictable en-
 vironment, creating around themselves a comfortable
 buffer zone. Behind these protective boundaries, French
 haute couture houses did set creative and fashion trends
 that had a worldwide impact. They also very much dic-
 tated technological and organizational solutions, institu-
 tionalizing them as key defining dimensions of the in-
 dustry's identity (Grumbach 1993, Dumas 1998).
 However, over the past 30 years, the predominance of
 French haute couture houses has come to be contested.
 It has become increasingly difficult for these traditional
 fashion companies to ignore and fend off the pressure
 stemming from emerging environmental trends. These
 environmental trends, playing out at a global level, have
 created many new and significant challenges, to which
 traditional players in the luxury fashion industry have fi-
 nally had to react.
 4.2. Global Pressure from the Late 1960s
 Many of the global trends that have come to redefine the
 environment for luxury fashion companies are quite simi-
 lar in fact to those shaping other industries. An evolution
 of the customer base and of its lifestyle has combined
 with technological transformations and a globalization of
 markets. These global trends have been further reinforced
 by an increasing competition and by the emergence, in
 particular, of companies challenging the predominance of
 traditional French haute couture houses. These outsiders
 have welcomed, seized upon, and pushed along a redef-
 inition of the rules of the game in the luxury fashion in-
 dustry that could only be to their benefit.
 Market demand for luxury fashion has changed signifi-
 cantly over the last 30 years or so. Traditional markets-
 Western Europe and the United States-have become
 mature. The original elite target groups for French haute
 couture houses, that had worn only or mostly made-to-
 order clothes, have gradually declined (Crane 1997). This
 could in part be explained by increasing costs and prices
 but also by changes in lifestyles. While this small elite
 was running dry, a growing mass of middle- and upper-
 middle class customers, with rising buying power, was
 looking for signs of "distinction" (Bourdieu 1979).
 Through their consumption of luxury goods, these new
 groups of customers have been searching for symbolic
 satisfaction in ways that have often differed from those
 of traditional elite group members (Gutsatz 1996, Ecole
 de Paris 1998). When traditional elite groups valued dis-
 tinction, hierarchy, order, or nobility, highly educated
 middle-class customers seem to care for entirely new sets
 of values-solidarity, meaning, genuineness, and ethics.
 Together with the education level of Western custom-
 ers, expectations also have grown. Customers have be-
 come increasingly able to manage their own choices; they
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 are autonomous and demanding. They have their own
 particular lifestyle and representation of the world, with
 which they expect the products they consume to resonate.
 Traditional haute couture houses, which used to rely on
 the intrinsic features of their products to trigger sales,
 have found that the product, nowadays, is far from self-
 sufficient. Customers look for perfect quality and service
 but also for price and immediate satisfaction as well as
 for a fit between the space for dreams characteristic of a
 brand and their own symbolic needs and representations.
 While markets have radically changed in nature, they
 have also expanded in geographic scope. The oil shock
 and the consequent influx of revenues in the Middle East,
 the economic boom in Asia, and the fall of the Berlin
 Wall, have pushed back the frontier for luxury goods
 companies. These new markets, characterized by an
 emerging elite hungry for symbols of status, have become
 highly attractive for fashion houses. But they have also
 contributed to making demand less homogeneous, rein-
 forcing a trend already characteristic of the industry's tra-
 ditional markets. Thus, like many other industries, the
 luxury fashion industry is facing a global challenge. The
 internationalization of markets is such that luxury fashion
 products and brands can potentially become universal. At
 the same time, though, luxury fashion companies will in-
 creasingly have to be sensitive to the multiplicity of
 needs, and they will have to adapt to the local peculiarities
 of demand.
 For those fashion houses embedded in a tradition of
 craftsmanship-the French players in particular-the ex-
 pansion and diversification of markets have brought along
 another significant challenge. To handle change and di-
 versity in their markets, luxury fashion companies have
 had to consider the integration of new technological tools
 and the adoption of modern management practices. At
 first sight, these appear to threaten the craftsmanship tra-
 dition. Managing the integration and striking a balance
 between tradition and innovation, mass production and
 customization, have thus become key challenges in the
 luxury fashion industry, in particular for those players
 deeply embedded in the industry traditions (Ecole de
 Paris 1998, Dumas 1998).
 4.3. Increasing Foreign Competition from the Late
 1970s
 The redefinition of markets and the strength of global
 pressure have created a window of opportunity in the lux-
 ury fashion industry, through which competition has
 rushed in. By playing upon and using these environmental
 transformations to their own advantage, new competitors
 or challengers have in fact come to reinforce them.
 Competition to traditional haute couture houses origi-
 nally emerged from within France as early as in the
 1960s. A number of small companies were then set up
 that did not fit the requirements for getting the haute cou-
 ture label. These createur companies thus remained at the
 margins of the industry. They made the most of their mar-
 ginal position and as a matter of fact invented a new in-
 dustry, the luxury ready-to-wear. They seized upon the
 unmistakable decline of the haute couture business, bet-
 ting upon instead and tapping into a widening group of
 middle- and upper-middle class customers that were ben-
 efiting from a period of significant economic growth in
 France (Grumbach 1993).
 The organized haute couture community still managed
 to keep control over this French competition. French
 createur companies remained relatively small in size and
 never became a significant threat to the haute couture
 community (Crane 1997). The main and real challenge
 came, in fact, a little later from beyond French national
 borders. Starting in the late 1970s and early 1980s, new
 players originating mostly from Italy and from the United
 States imposed themselves at the luxury end of the fash-
 ion market. These challengers perceived evolving market
 and market demand in the luxury fashion business more
 as opportunities than as threats.
 By anticipating and building upon the global trends
 identified above, Italian and American entrants have
 made significant forays into the luxury fashion industry.
 Bypassing the stringent requirements for entry into the
 haute couture industry, they have bet instead upon luxury
 ready-to-wear. These outsiders have welcomed and
 pushed further along a redefinition of the rule of the game
 that could only be to their benefit. In the process, they
 have reinforced existing global trends and significantly
 contributed to reshaping the luxury fashion industry
 (Gutsatz 1996, Ecole de Paris 1998, Martin 1998).
 Defining customers as coconstructors or cocreators and
 not merely passive consumers, Italian and American chal-
 lengers have brought about a redefinition of the relation-
 ship between fashion companies and their markets. These
 challengers take into account customers, their various
 profiles, and symbolic needs or expectations. Quite simi-
 lar in that to fashion companies at the lower end of the
 industry, these new entrants to the luxury fashion industry
 do not only design, manufacture, and sell their products.
 They also interact with their customers and systematically
 segment their markets and channels of distribution
 (Nueno and Quelch 1998). The challenge here thus be-
 comes to accept and integrate, at least to some extent,
 different symbolic needs and expectations without losing
 control of the identity of the brand.
 At the same time, the multiplicity and diversity of sym-
 bolic needs has very important consequences. A "street-
 wise" creator, having a good sense of the symbolic needs
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 of a particular target group and able to secure significant
 financial backing, can create a new brand or renovate an
 old one and successfully develop and exploit it. The
 astounding revival in the 1990s of brands like Gucci and
 Prada or the success of the Italian Etro, which in less than
 ten years has been transformed from an obscure fabric
 designer to a cult fashion brand, bear witness to that (La
 Tribune, 7 April 1998). Quick success, though, goes to-
 gether with quick failure, as when the space for dreams
 associated with a particular brand no longer resonates
 with the symbolic needs of a large enough group of cus-
 tomers. The recent bankruptcy of the American Isaac
 Misrahi, which experienced rapid growth and success in
 the early 1990s, or the difficulties of the British company
 Laura Ashley are clear illustrations of that (Wall Street
 Journal, 20 April 1998).
 5. Organizational Responses: The
 Institutional Embeddedness of
 Trajectories
 Facing radical market transformation, increasing tech-
 nological complexity, and heightened competition, lux-
 ury fashion companies have had to react and adapt. In the
 context of significant environmental dislocation, many
 have felt the need for greater organizational flexibility.
 The meaning of organizational flexibility, though, and the
 paths or trajectories leading to it have varied significantly,
 particularly across national borders. In the luxury fashion
 industry, one can in fact easily identify national paths or
 trajectories to flexibility. Differences between these na-
 tional ideal types can largely be traced to historical leg-
 acies and institutional constraints, which, at least thus far,
 have been defined, constructed, and reconstructed at the
 national level. Exceptions to these national ideal types
 can naturally be found in each country, but they remain
 on the whole marginal and isolated.
 5.1. French Craft-Based Organizations-The Weight
 of Tradition
 Until World War II, French haute couture was a highly
 stable industry where made-to-order clothes for women
 were the principal source of revenue. The business of
 designing, making, and selling fashionable custom-made
 clothing was a craft and labor-intensive process that did
 not require significant investments. The clientele was
 small and homogeneous, mostly drawn from within the
 ranks of the French aristocracy and upper-middle class
 (Grumbach 1993, Crane 1997). This privileged elite was
 furthermore fairly loyal, and clients tended to dress ex-
 clusively with one single house.
 In the tradition pioneered by Charles Frederick Worth,
 a couturier or artistic designer typically owned each
 house. The image and success of each house was closely
 dependent upon the unique creative power of its designer,
 who was also often in charge of running the business.
 This designer has traditionally been a "cult" figure,
 around whom everything seemed to revolve and upon
 whom everything seemed to depend. As artist and crafts-
 man, he or she ensured that the process as a whole, from
 creation to manufacturing and distribution, would be fully
 integrated (Dumas 1998). This step-by-step monitoring,
 which amounted in fact to a quality control integrated
 upstream, was essentially achieved through a reliance on
 traditional savoir faires-or traditional craft tech-
 niques-inherited from the past. Thus, while the success
 and predominance of French haute couture houses orig-
 inally built upon their explorative capacities in design and
 creation, the dominant logic when it came to technology
 and organization was an exploitation of old and seasoned
 recipes. To this day, the very identity of French haute
 couture houses has appeared to lie in their reliance upon
 traditional practices at all stages of the integrated pro-
 duction process.
 As already underscored, the predominance of French
 haute couture houses was further strengthened for a while
 by the existence of a protective set of institutions and
 rules that all but sealed off the boundaries of the industry.
 Each house had in itself little slack, but the institution-
 alized organization of the French fashion industry created
 somewhat of a buffer zone around members of that in-
 dustry. This system emphasized stability and conformity,
 preventing radical breaks and rejuvenation. As a conse-
 quence, the creative spirit within French haute couture
 houses has gradually tended to dry up. Losing somewhat
 their creative edge, French haute couture houses thus en-
 tered the 1980s in an already weakened position. By that
 time, furthermore, the global challenges described above
 were becoming too strong to be ignored. Facing compe-
 tition and increasing levels of environmental turbulence
 and ambiguity, French haute couture houses had to think
 of possible ways to respond. They had, in particular, to
 consider how they might integrate a degree of organiza-
 tional flexibility. They came up with essentially two kinds
 of answers-outsourcing and what we call here the "um-
 brella holding."
 Outsourcing and the Risk of Losing One's Iden-
 tity. Breaking up the integrated, in-house process and
 outsourcing or licensing parts of it represented an obvious
 way to secure advantages of scale and scope while still
 integrating a degree of organizational flexibility. This so-
 lution has tempted several French haute couture houses.
 Companies like Pierre Cardin or Christian Dior were
 among the first to license their lines or products on a large
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 scale. But, starting in the 1970s, most haute couture
 houses were engaging in at least partial licensing or out-
 sourcing for their perfumes, accessories, and ready-to-
 wear lines.
 Although easy and tempting, such a strategy undenia-
 bly entailed a number of risks. In the craft-based and
 tradition-grounded French luxury fashion industry, stable
 organizational solutions were more than a virtue. They
 were part and parcel of the product and of the brand im-
 age. Because it was bound to disrupt the integrated, in-
 house process, any attempt to develop productive capac-
 ities, to exploit particular products or the brand name,
 could threaten the specificity of the products and the iden-
 tity of the company. This has been the argument put for-
 ward to this day by a company like Hermes in refusing
 any tampering with its image through licensing or out-
 sourcing. A source of great pride for Hermes-and an
 important dimension of its self-definition as a "luxury"
 company-is undeniably the fact that never in its history
 did it give in to the temptation of outsourcing or licensing
 (Dumas 1998; Les Echos, 26 March 1998).
 In striking contrast, Pierre Cardin did bet on systematic
 licensing. This company explored new solutions to the
 detriment of traditional craft techniques and organiza-
 tional routines, which had for a long time made up the
 core of its identity as a haute couture house. It privileged,
 in the process, the systematic exploitation of existing
 products and of its brand name over the explorative core
 competence, which had originally built and maintained
 its identity as an innovative fashion company. This even-
 tually led the Chambre Syndicale de la Haute Couture to
 exclude the Pierre Cardin house. The company Pierre
 Cardin still exists and it is in fact quite prosperous-a
 total turnover of $6.5 billion (U.S.) in 1997, profits un-
 disclosed. The Pierre Cardin brand name, though, has un-
 deniably lost some of its luster and its products are not
 so readily identified as luxury goods (Les Echos, July 11,
 1998).
 Constrained by peculiar historical legacies and insti-
 tutional conditions, French haute couture houses have
 thus had limited room for maneuver. They have tradi-
 tionally been defined by the very integration of their ac-
 tivity and by the full control which the main designer has
 kept over it. In this context, the classical and easy path
 to flexibility-outsourcing parts of the process and some
 of the activities of the organization-has appeared to
 threaten the very identity of these companies. This does
 not mean, though, that under conditions of severe envi-
 ronmental turbulence the French luxury fashion industry
 is necessarily doomed. In the face of global challenges,
 some French luxury fashion houses appear to follow their
 own, quite unique path to organizational flexibility. This
 path is leading them directly from a craft-based model of
 organization to a form of flexible or modular organiza-
 tional arrangement, which we label here the "umbrella
 holding."
 The "Umbrella Holding." The strategy of diversifi-
 cation devised before the First World War by the French
 couturier, Poiret, anticipated what we call the "umbrella
 holding" trajectory. Poiret had early on been aware that
 the haute couture industry faced an uncertain future. His
 idea was to launch a diversification of the product range
 and in particular to add subsidiary lines of products to
 clothing (Grumbach 1993). This type of strategy seduced
 other couturiers. It became increasingly successful and
 widespread after the Second World War, when the market
 for made-to-order clothes gave clear signs of rapid de-
 cline. The main subsidiary product was perfume, but
 many haute couture houses also diversified into cosmet-
 ics, accessories, and most importantly into different types
 of ready-to-wear lines of clothing for women, but also for
 men, and in some cases for children.
 When it gained significant scope, such a strategy re-
 quired integrating a degree of flexibility and modularity
 within the boundaries of the organization. Each product
 line was different, and each unit producing and marketing
 it became relatively autonomous, taking a life of its own
 under the umbrella of the brand name. Some compa-
 nies-Christian Dior or Yves Saint Laurent for example,
 but not Hermes-subcontracted parts of the production
 for subsidiary lines. In this context, the all-important role
 of the main designer or couturier was to maintain tight
 control over the subsidiary lines and the subcontractors,
 so that quality problems would not impact upon the brand
 name.
 The diversification strategy in the French luxury in-
 dustry has thus traditionally amounted to creating, under
 a single brand name, several relatively autonomous or-
 ganizational entities, each being fully in charge of a given
 product line and only controlled from the core. By hind-
 sight, at least, it is thus not surprising that a peculiar con-
 glomerate or holding company such as LVMH (Louis
 Vuitton Moet Hennessy) would emerge in that industry.
 The strategy of Bernard Arnault-founder and present
 Chairman of LVMH-has been to bring together, under
 the same umbrella holding company, a nun-iber of for-
 merly independent luxury houses, and to exploit their
 brand reputation while keeping each house largely auton-
 omous. The idea is that each brand is valuable on its own
 and that more harm than synergy could result from too
 close an integration. The portfolio of LVMH currently
 includes luxury fashion houses such as Givenchy, Kenzo,
 Christian Lacroix, Celine, and Christian Dior but also a
 number of luxury companies producing accessories
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 (Louis Vuitton, Loewe), perfumes, wines, or spirits. Re-
 cently, LVMH has diversified further into selective re-
 tailing and distribution, an activity that directly comple-
 ments the production of luxury goods. The most famous
 example of such vertical diversification has been the ac-
 quisition in 1996 of Duty Free Shoppers (DFS), a world-
 wide chain of duty free outlets (Choez 1998; Le Figaro,
 16 March 1998). The umbrella holding or the peculiar
 French path to flexibility is sketched out in Figure 1.
 As of now, LVMH is still an aggregate in search of
 identity. A number of recent developments, though, seem
 to indicate that this aggregate could in time develop into
 a truly flexible internal network. Bernard Arnault and his
 top management are working to create and foster inter-
 faces between the various modules or entities. The objec-
 tive is to optimize the overall performance of the aggre-
 gate or internal network by rationalizing a number of
 potentially common activities-marketing, distribution,
 or even production (Martin 1998). At the very same time,
 the top management of LVMH is very conscious of the
 need to preserve the traditional craft-based nature of each
 module. This, after all, is where the value of French lux-
 ury fashion brands lies. While the umbrella holding tra-
 jectory is still very much in construction, we believe that
 it may be the only chance of survival in the long term for
 individual French fashion-and in particular haute cou-
 ture-houses.
 5.2. Italian and American Fashion Companies-The
 Challengers
 Most French haute couture houses have thus been finding
 it hard, outside or within LVMH, to strike a balance be-
 tween their traditional identity and the changes required
 by evolving markets and market demand. In the mean-
 time, new entrants from Italy and the United States have
 seized upon these trends, constructing them as opportu-
 nities rather than threats. These challengers chose not to
 compete head-on with traditional French players. Rather,
 they welcomed and fostered a radical redefinition, for the
 industry, of the rules of the competitive game that could
 only be to their benefit.
 They did so by betting on and building upon what had
 merely been a side strategy for French couturiers. They
 systematically turned subsidiary lines-luxury ready-to-
 wear, perfume, cosmetics, or accessories-into the core
 of their business. In the process, they developed what
 were, for the luxury goods industry, original and inno-
 vative organizational solutions. To make the most of the
 expansion of markets, Italian and American challengers
 increased their productive capacities through mechani-
 zation and standardization as well as partial outsourcing.
 To handle the greater sophistication of customers, the
 multiplicity of their profiles, and the changing nature of
 their needs, they designed flexible and speedily reactive
 organizations, directly tuned into the "world of the
 street."
 In the recent past, two variants of the flexible network
 organization-one Italian, the other American-have
 thus emerged in the luxury fashion industry. These vari-
 ants differ essentially along two dimensions. In the Italian
 case, the networks of partners and subcontractors tend to
 have a smaller and much more stable membership than
 in the American case. The extent of outsourcing is much
 more significant in the American case than in the Italian
 case, with only a minimal range of activities being kept
 in-house. While both the Italian and American variants
 have emerged in the context of significant and global en-
 vironmental dislocation, each exemplifies a particular tra-
 jectory towards flexibility and modularity. In turn, these
 two trajectories are quite different from the one identified
 in the French case.
 These trajectories, we show below, have been shaped
 in part by the early choices of national pioneer companies
 and by the national institutional environments in which
 these companies were embedded. In fact, the difference
 between both variants can be traced to the historical and
 institutional legacies peculiar to each national environ-
 ment.
 The Italian Model: The Flexible Embedded Net-
 work. A peculiarity of the Italian economy-particu-
 larly in the region that has come to be known as the Third
 Italy-has been the survival and dynamism of traditional
 industrial districts. The prosperity, since 1945, of indus-
 trial districts in this region has in fact quite strikingly
 contrasted with their near disappearance in some other
 Western European countries, particularly in France
 (Djelic 1998). These industrial districts are made up of
 large numbers of small entities, whether craft workshops
 or small industrial firms (Brusco 1982, Goodman and
 Bamford 1989, Lazerson 1995). Engaging in multilateral
 forms of cooperation, these entities have traditionally cre-
 ated dense networks backed by adequate institutional and
 political support, at the regional and national levels
 (Weiss 1988).
 Embedded as they often were in these traditional in-
 dustrial districts, Italian fashion houses have been able to
 come up with innovative organizational solutions. When,
 in the French case, the path to luxury fashion has been
 design and creation, manufacturing has been the core
 competence Italians have built upon (The Economist, 11
 April 1998; La Tribune, 7 April 1998). The Italian fashion
 industry has emerged as a set of flexible and relatively
 stable networks, tightly embedded in local or regional
 industrial communities. These networks have enabled
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 Figure 1 The French Trajectory-The Umbrella Holding
 HOLDING
 Finance, Personnel...
 COMMON SERVICES (or potentially so)
 Logistics, Marketing, Advertising,
 CORE Distribution, Manufacturing, Subcontracting
 Individual House Individual House Individual House
 Brand Name 1 Brand Name 2 Brand Name 3
 Design, Design, Design,
 Manufacturing, Manufacturing, Manufacturing,
 Sales, Brand Sales, Brand Sales, Brand
 Management Management Management
 PERIPHERY Some subcontracting: No subcontracting Some subcontracting:
 second lines or accessories second lines or accessories
 Italian fashion houses to reconcile flexibility with almost
 limitless production capacity. Italian fashion companies
 have subcontracted a large share of their manufacturing
 activity, keeping in-house only a few key product lines.
 Their networks of industrial partners have typically been
 small and stable, allowing them to keep tight but still
 informal control. By privileging networks over organic
 growth, Italian fashion companies have been able to com-
 bine the best of two worlds. On the one hand, they have
 been able to easily and flexibly manage variation in de-
 mand. On the other hand, they have not had to sacrifice
 craft production or the quality of products.
 By setting up networks, Italian fashion companies have
 kept the advantages of small size and flexibility-crea-
 tivity, adaptability, and speed of reaction to market
 changes. By limiting, and sometimes altogether avoiding,
 the licensing strategy, they have been able to keep stricter
 control over products and brands (Women's Wear Daily,
 10 December 1997). The tight nature of the network link-
 ing Italian luxury fashion companies to their subcontrac-
 tors and the regularity of partnerships have made direct
 control and monitoring relatively easy. Italian fashion
 companies have naturally handled problems of interface
 by setting up and systematically using quality-control
 tools. The foundation of trust, though, stemming from a
 common institutional and cultural background, has by far
 been the most powerful coupling mechanism (Brusco
 1982, Granovetter 1985, Powell 1990, Lazerson 1995).
 This particular path to flexibility or modularity has
 been common to Italian fashion companies from the low
 to the high end of the industry. It is characteristic of a
 company like Benetton, but it also defines the organiza-
 tion of luxury fashion companies such as Armani, Gucci,
 or Prada (The Economist, 11 April 1998; Le Monde, 18
 January 1998). By following this particular path towards
 the network form, Italian fashion companies have decou-
 pled somewhat their brand name from the product and
 the production process, in striking contrast to French
 haute couture houses. Italian fashion companies thus pay
 close attention to brand management in itself, distinct
 from the monitoring of product, creation, or distribution.
 As shown in Figure 2, core activities have increasingly
 been handled as separate modules-and these core activ-
 ities have included design and creation, brand manage-
 ment (marketing, advertising, promotion), or quality con-
 trol.
 Gucci's Tom Ford explains the rapid success of his
 company in the 1990s by the creation of a coherent brand
 and by its close monitoring. In the case of Gucci, reaching
 Figure 2 Core and Peripheral Modules in the Italian Trajec-
 tory
 Brand Quality
 CORE Design Management Control
 Manufacturing - Distribution -
 I Core l l Core
 Manufacturing Distribution
 PERIPHERY (network of regular (franchise
 (OUTSOURCED) subcontractors) network)
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 coherence has meant revamping all products and product
 lines. A combination of coherent brand management with
 high-quality manufacturing, subcontracted to a tight net-
 work of regular partners, has also been the recipe behind
 the rapid and astounding success of a company like
 Giorgio Armani (Le Monde, 18 January 1998).
 The organizational model described above is naturally
 an ideal type and a number of exceptions may be found.
 Its key features, however, are important to explain the
 success of Jtalian luxury fashion companies in the 1980s
 and early 1990s. Success has bred confidence and,
 through confidence, stability. The fundamentals of the
 model have thus been institutionalized, and they are not
 being questioned. New challenges, though, are emerging.
 For companies like Gucci, Prada, or Armani, the main
 questions today seem to be how to sustain growth, ensure
 survival, and create the conditions for continuing perfor-
 mance independent of the current designer or manage-
 ment team. Rather than going public-a strategy more
 readily considered in the United States-Italian compa-
 nies seem to take an interest in the model of the umbrella
 holding company as exemplified by LVMH. Patrizio
 Bertelli, Prada's Chairman, praises LVMH's strategy and
 seriously considers, apparently, following it himself:
 The idea is to acquire other luxury goods brands that could not
 only coexist, but exploit synergies wherever possible. For ex-
 ample, in the area of service and financial management-these
 areas of business can be in common. (Patrizio Bertelli in
 Women's Wear Daily, 10 December 1997).
 The American Model: Towards the Virtual Organiza-
 tion. A specific feature of the American economy is the
 sheer size and buying power of its national market. That
 the United States invented mass production and mass
 marketing is therefore not surprising (Djelic 1998). With
 such a market to serve, and to reach economies of scale,
 American companies have for some time viewed spe-
 cialization and subcontracting as possible and efficient
 strategies. The sheer size of the country, though, and the
 history of its settlement explain that subcontracting was
 not as likely as in Italy to be contained within strict re-
 gional boundaries. Even in those locally or regionally
 constituted communities that share a common basis of
 trust, interfirm networks have always included, in the
 United States, a majority of arm's-length ties regulated
 by spot contracts (Uzzi 1997, p. 42). In contrast, the Ital-
 ian flexible and embedded networks have generally fa-
 vored tight links and long-term partnerships.
 The particular path or trajectory followed by American
 fashion companies mirrors the peculiarities of the insti-
 tutional context in which they have evolved. It also re-
 flects the process through which these companies have
 entered the luxury segment of the fashion industry. Ralph
 Lauren, Calvin Klein, and Donna Karan have managed
 to establish themselves in the luxury fashion industry
 without submitting to the stringent rules and requirements
 set up by the French community of couturiers. Even more
 than their Italian competitors, American fashion compa-
 nies are new entrants at the luxury end of the fashion
 industry. They have managed to impose themselves with-
 out building upon a product legitimacy that had tradition-
 ally been symbolized, in the industry, by an haute couture
 activity. American fashion companies originally started
 from mass production at a lower end of the industry. To
 this day, Ralph Lauren, Calvin Klein, or Donna Karan do
 not have any haute couture activity. Over time, though,
 they have managed to scale up their products and their
 image by creating around their brand name a coherent
 space for dreams that echoed the symbolic needs of a
 particular customer group. This particular strategy has
 made it possible for American companies to price beau-
 tiful but rather standard ready- to-wear products at a level
 comparable to that of their French haute couture com-
 petitors-Christian Dior or Chanel for example.
 These particular historical and institutional legacies ex-
 plain why it has been relatively easy for American players
 to fully decouple brand from product and to outsource
 most of the production process. Brand management has
 emerged, in this context, as the core or strategic compe-
 tence of the organization. When design and creation are
 still at the heart of the French luxury fashion industry and
 manufacturing is key to Italian fashion, one could easily
 argue that, for American players, the source of competi-
 tive advantage has been brand management. There are,
 naturally, a number of small- or medium-sized American
 fashion houses, which play upon creative design and in-
 novation rather than brand management. The names Anna
 Sui, Michael Kors, or Bob Mackie come to mind. These
 companies are closer in type to the French cre'ateur
 houses. Altogether, though, they weigh very little on the
 American and worldwide market and cannot compare to
 the likes of Calvin Klein, Ralph Lauren, or even Donna
 Karan (Women's Wear Daily, 7 November 1997).
 In the case of those leading American companies, the
 radical decoupling of the brand name from product and
 production has made possible and even triggered orga-
 nizational modularity. In fact, the path to modularity fol-
 lowed by these companies has been characterized by
 speed and by its systematic nature. The emerging network
 form of organization is quite close, in the end, to what
 the literature has labeled the "virtual organization."
 American fashion companies have kept in-house only a
 minimal range of activities-those defined as strategic
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 and core competences and amounting in effect to a moni-
 toring of the overall coherence of the brand. For com-
 panies like Ralph Lauren, Calvin Klein, or Donna Karan,
 the value of the brand name is naturally related to the
 quality of products and processes. At the same time,
 though, and maybe more importantly, the legitimacy and
 the value of products and product lines stem from the sets
 of symbolic representations that are associated with the
 brand name. American fashion companies build upon
 concepts-those intangible goods that define brand
 names. From these concepts, they deduce product lines
 and products but also marketing strategies, the design of
 stores, and other communication tools (Nueno and
 Quelch 1998).
 For fashion companies like Ralph Lauren, Calvin
 Klein, or Donna Karan, managing the brand has thus im-
 plied much more than a simple attention to the quality
 and consistency of products and services. It has meant
 ensuring the overall coherence of the script, articulating
 a series of interdependent sequences of events, selecting
 some, dropping others, arranging and rearranging them
 according to changing conditions and needs. These com-
 panies have not been afraid of complex organizational
 arrangements consisting of large numbers of relatively
 autonomous modules. They can be described as "hubs,"
 where the core competence is the coordination and man-
 agement of interfaces between modules.
 Like the Italians, but unlike the French, leading Amer-
 ican fashion companies have entirely licensed off or sub-
 contracted manufacturing. In contrast to both the Italians
 and the French, the Americans have also outsourced, at
 least in part, design, creation, or brand management to
 freelance designers, communication and advertising
 agencies, or consultants. As Figure 3 shows, leading
 American fashion companies have retained in-house little
 more than strategic decision making. They have kept full
 control over important choices regarding design and
 product lines, the selection of materials, brand manage-
 ment (marketing, advertising, promotion, merchandis-
 ing), the handling of quality-control tools, the monitoring
 of subcontracting partners or licensees, and, finally, the
 elaboration of a distribution strategy.
 American fashion companies like Ralph Lauren,
 Calvin Klein, or Donna Karan have thus evolved towards
 a network form of organization. Unable to build upon,
 though, a locally embedded community of potential part-
 ners and subcontractors as in the Italian case, they have
 created networks their own way. They have mostly relied
 on arm' s-length ties and spot contracts and they have built
 in flexible membership so as to follow organizational
 needs and market transformations. The challenge with
 this type of network arrangement stems essentially both
 from the shifting geometry of the network and from the
 great number of interfaces between the various modules.
 To reach a satisfactory level of control, American fashion
 companies have had to foster and bring about a degree of
 standardization of these interfaces. They have done so by
 setting clear and detailed sets of instructions to map out
 the work of subcontractors and partners, but also by de-
 fining strict quality standards, deadlines, and control pro-
 cedures. This monitoring of interfaces has generally been
 formalized through explicit legal contracts. It has been
 made possible by the integration of sophisticated infor-
 mation systems.
 In this particular context, the role of what we call here
 an "organizational pilot" appears to be quite significant.
 In companies like Ralph Lauren, Calvin Klein, or Donna
 Karan, the responsibility with respect to the overall co-
 herence of the brand does indeed lie with such a pilot. He
 or she is at the same time the founder, the designer, and,
 maybe most importantly, the top manager. Naturally, the
 role of this organizational pilot is far from being a simple
 one. The recent difficulties Donna Karan has faced in her
 attempt to articulate the core of her company with its
 Figure 3 Core and Peripheral Modules in the American Trajectory
 I STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING
 Brand I
 CORE Design, Management, Quality Management of Distribution
 Materials Communication Control Subcontractors Plan
 PERIPHERY Design, Creation Brand Manufacturing Distribution
 (OUTSOURCED) (freelance Management (multiple (multiple licensees
 designers) (subcontractors) subcontractors and and outlet stores)
 I designers) I I I | licensees
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 peripheral modules clearly bear witness to that (Les
 Echos, 24 March 1998).
 6. Discussion and Concluding Remarks
 The environments in which organizations are embedded
 set constraints and define opportunities. They very much
 shape, as a consequence, the paths or trajectories which
 these organizations are going to follow and their struc-
 tural evolution through time. Focusing on the luxury fash-
 ion industry as our empirical base of evidence, we found
 that it has had to face increasingly turbulent and ambig-
 uous environmental conditions, particularly over the past
 30 years. Before this period of significant environmental
 dislocation, French haute couture houses had been able,
 due to their early lead in the luxury fashion industry, to
 set the rules of the game and to control the boundaries of
 the industry. In the process, they institutionalized tech-
 nological and organizational stability. In recent years,
 though, French fashion houses have found it more and
 more difficult to ignore the pressures stemming from
 global challenges. Market expansion and diversification
 have combined with radical technological evolution and
 increasing competition to alter the rules of the game.
 The main challengers have been Italian and American
 companies. Without an haute couture tradition, these
 companies have successfully managed to scale up their
 product lines and to reposition themselves at the high or
 luxury end of the fashion industry. These outsiders have
 seized upon global environmental trends to foster a re-
 definition of the rules of the game in the luxury fashion
 industry that could only be to their benefit. They have
 contributed, in the process, to increasing the level of en-
 vironmental dislocation and turbulence in that industry.
 In the face of such environmental turbulence, most
 companies in the luxury fashion industry, including
 French haute couture houses, have felt the need to react.
 Organizational flexibility and modularity-or the net-
 work form-have emerged as a common answer. How-
 ever, we have found that organizational modularity or the
 network form did not always mean the same thing and
 that there were in fact different paths or trajectories lead-
 ing to organizational flexibility. Historical legacies, we
 have shown, and the peculiarities of national institutional
 contexts have to a significant extent shaped these trajec-
 tories. Opportunities and constraints have differed from
 one national environment to the next. Nationally defined
 opportunities and constraints had an impact upon the
 French pioneers, who created and institutionalized early
 organizational solutions in that industry. In turn, these
 early solutions shaped environmental conditions for or-
 ganizational players, setting the boundaries of the indus-
 try, the rules of the game, and even the possible ways to
 go around them.
 Altogether, we have thus been able to document in this
 paper that global trends or challenges on the one hand,
 historical legacies and the peculiarities of national insti-
 tutional constraints on the other, have shaped and con-
 tinue to shape paths to organizational flexibility as well
 as the network forms emerging in the luxury fashion in-
 dustry.
 In France, the weight of organizational legacies and
 institutionalized practices turned out to create significant
 constraints for haute couture houses, narrowing and lim-
 iting the range of possible reactions in the face of global
 challenges. In particular, licensing and outsourcing, as
 strategies to integrate a degree of organizational flexibil-
 ity, have appeared to be fraught with dangers. Such strat-
 egies were bound to disrupt the integrated, in-house pro-
 duction process and, as a consequence, they were likely
 to destroy the value of the products and to threaten the
 image and the very identity of French haute couture
 houses.
 This does not have to mean, though, that under con-
 ditions of significant environmental disruption, the
 French luxury fashion industry is necessarily doomed. As
 a matter of fact, a peculiar trajectory to organizational
 modularity has been emerging in the French case, which
 we have labeled the "umbrella holding." The umbrella
 holding brings together existing organizational entities
 and brand names. It becomes in the process an internal
 network that can rationalize a number of shared compe-
 tences while respecting the autonomy and integrity of
 each component module. Considering the historical and
 institutional constraints characteristic of the French case,
 the umbrella holding appears to be a locally legitimate
 way to adapt to global change. At the same time, we argue
 that it might be the only chance of survival, in the long
 term, for individual French fashion houses.
 While French haute couture houses have generally
 been quite reluctant to change, Italian and American chal-
 lengers early on seized upon environmental trends to
 make significant headway in the industry. Identifying
 global challenges as opportunities, they have managed to
 redefine in part the rules of the game. In order to be at
 the same time globally efficient and locally in tune with
 their customer base, Italian and American players have
 created flexible organizational solutions. Instead of bring-
 ing together several craft-based entities and brand names
 under a single umbrella holding, they have defined them-
 selves and organized as networks of competences. A
 number of these competences-those considered particu-
 larly strategic-were integrated at the core, while others,
 more peripheral, were outsourced or licensed off.
 Beyond the similarities, though, there were enough dif-
 ferences between the Italian and the American cases that
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 we could in fact identify two variants of the flexible net-
 work organization-one Italian, the other American. In
 the context of significant and global environmental dis-
 location, each variant exemplifies, we argue, a particular
 trajectory towards organizational flexibility. We have
 shown in this paper that differences between those two
 trajectories can be traced to the historical and institutional
 legacies peculiar to each national environment.
 Italian fashion companies have made the most of the
 industrial districts in which they were locally embedded
 to construct flexible but relatively stable networks with
 regular partners. In the Italian case, as a consequence,
 networks of partners and subcontractors have tended to
 be tight and strictly embedded within the local or regional
 community. The foundation of trust stemming from a
 common institutional and cultural background has made
 the management of interfaces fairly easy and not too
 costly.
 Evidence from the American case, on the other hand,
 points to a more open network form. In this case, the
 extent of outsourcing has been much more significant and
 only a minimal range of activities has been kept in-house.
 This would seem to indicate an evolution in the direction
 of what has been labeled in the literature the "virtual or-
 ganization," where more and more activities are being
 outsourced. The open character of such an organizational
 solution means that an increasingly smaller core has been
 responsible for the articulation of a series of relatively
 independent tasks. Even in situations of high ambiguity
 and uncertainty, this form of organization could remain
 most flexible and adaptable. Modules could be rear-
 ranged, newly created, or altogether dropped to fit chang-
 ing conditions and purposes.
 The American or "virtual" model gives a lot of weight
 to an organizational pilot or manager, in contrast to the
 key role of the product designer in the French tradition
 of haute couture or to the collective responsibility char-
 acteristic of the Italian flexible and embedded network.
 The manager becomes responsible for steering the orga-
 nization, identifying opportunities, making choices, and
 mapping the migration path of the organization. Of
 course, this particular characteristic of the American so-
 lution is also its main weakness, and the identification of
 the skills and competencies necessary for such organi-
 zational pilots is certainly an interesting path for future
 research.
 To sum up, we have documented in this paper that, in
 the luxury fashion industry, organizational flexibility or
 modularity has emerged as a common answer to global
 challenges and increasing environmental dislocation.
 Probing further, however, we have been able to identify
 three different paths or trajectories leading to such orga-
 nizational flexibility or modularity-the "umbrella hold-
 ing," the "flexible embedded network," and the "virtual
 organization." In each case, we have traced the peculi-
 arities of these paths or trajectories-constructed in the
 paper as national ideal types-to peculiar historical leg-
 acies and institutional constraints.
 We have thus found strong support, in the case of the
 luxury fashion industry, for a coevolution perspective
 where environmental transformation and organizational
 change interplay through time, feeding upon each other
 (Lewin et al., in this issue). By pointing to path-dependent
 and historically constructed processes of interaction be-
 tween organization forms, global environmental trends,
 and national legacies, this paper contributes to discus-
 sions about the mechanisms of coevolution. We have to
 conclude, though, that, in our minds, the existence of dif-
 ferent trajectories makes convergence or congruence
 highly unlikely. The evidence we have built from does
 not allow us to claim that the different variants of flexible
 organizations might someday converge towards a global
 and uniform standard. In the debate on new organization
 forms, we thus question the likelihood of a future stabi-
 lization around a unique organizational solution that
 would become widely legitimated and institutionalized.
 Rather, we argue that differences are there to stay beyond
 the period of transition and acute environmental dislo-
 cation, embedded as they are in powerful historical and
 institutional legacies.
 On the basis of this study, we believe that more re-
 search should be undertaken in at least two directions.
 There is a need, firstly, to test the applicability of the three
 network forms or ideal types identified here in other con-
 texts and in other industries. Another important issue
 seems to be the role of organizational pilots or managers.
 While the coevolution perspective provides an interesting
 theory of organizational and institutional constraints,
 there is a need to cross-fertilize it with a theory of agency.
 More work is undeniably needed, both empirical and
 theoretical, in that direction.
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